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Disabled but Unqualified:
The Essential Functions Requirement as a
Proxy for the Ideal Worker Norm
Michael Edward Olsen, Jr.*
Over the course of nearly two decades, courts have narrowed the employment protections
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 by interpreting the term “disabled” so
narrowly that virtually no person qualified for the Act’s protections. Moreover, if a
person was sufficiently “disabled,” they were often so severely disabled that they could
not work at all; thus, they were not “qualified individuals” who could perform the essential
functions of the job.
In response, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of
2008 to give broad coverage to persons with disabilities. Courts have followed this mandate
by interpreting the term “disabled” broadly; however, courts still find that persons are not
“qualified” because they cannot perform the essential functions of their position. This Note
shows that courts frequently give deference to employers in the “essential functions”
inquiry. Moreover, courts import normative assumptions about how jobs should be
performed into the essential functions inquiry, contrary to congressional intent. As a
consequence, courts infrequently reach the reasonable accommodation process—where
the court asks whether the employer can accommodate an employee’s limitations without
imposing an undue hardship on the employer.
This Note suggests several remedies. First, Congress could clarify that courts are not
required to defer to an employer’s job description and, relatedly, courts could give greater
weight to the actual job duties performed by an employee. Finally, Congress could
explicitly delegate substantive rulemaking authority to the EEOC, as it did with the term
“disabled.”

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I would like to
thank Professor Joan Williams for her feedback and guidance in writing this Note. I would also like to
thank my partner Brian Nguyen for his love and support. This Note is dedicated to my son, Tyler
Michael Bach Nguyen, who was born in April 2014. I hope Tyler will one day enter a workforce that is
just and equal for all persons. I would also like to thank Henna Choi for reviewing drafts of this Note.
Thanks also to the Notes team, particularly Elliot Hosman and Andrew Ohlert, for their thoughtful
feedback. Finally, I would like to thank Editor-in-Chief Emily Goldberg Knox for her tremendous
work and leadership, as well as the entire staff of Volume 66 for their dedication in producing this Issue.

[1485]

N - OLSEN_16 (ONLINE)

1486

6/22/2015 9:44 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1485

Table of Contents
Introduction.............................................................................................. 1486
I. The History of the ADAAA ............................................................. 1488
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 .................. 1488
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act of 2008 .............................................................................. 1490
C. The Broader Picture: Explaining Judicial Hostility .... 1493
II. Courts Have (Almost) Universally Embraced an Expansive
Definition of Disability .................................................................... 1496
III. Continuing Hurdles for Plaintiffs with Disabilities and
the Essential Functions Inquiry ................................................... 1498
A. Deference to the Employer ................................................. 1503
1. The Eighth Circuit ............................................................. 1504
2. The Third Circuit ............................................................... 1505
3. Lower Courts and the Seventh Circuit as Exemplars ..... 1506
B. Individualized Inquiry: Getting the Essential
Functions Requirement Right ............................................ 1506
C. Workplace Policies as Essential Functions:
Attendance and Leave Policies ......................................... 1509
IV. Remedying the Problem with Essential Functions ................... 1514
A. The Third Time’s the Charm: Amending the ADA
(Again)..................................................................................... 1514
1. Give Greater Evidentiary Weight to Actual Job
Performance ....................................................................... 1515
2. Amend the Definition of “Qualified” in the ADA to
Focus on Central Job Functions ....................................... 1515
3. Require That the Employer “Knew or Should Have
Known” of the Disability .................................................. 1516
4. Explicitly Delegate Substantive Rulemaking Authority
to the EEOC....................................................................... 1519
B. The Ideal Worker Norm ...................................................... 1520
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 1522
Introduction
1
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)
prohibits employment discrimination against a “qualified individual with a
2
disability.” Congress premised the ADA partly on a finding that people
with disabilities have experienced a history of discrimination in employment
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2015).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213).
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3

and other facets of public life. People with disabilities have faced
discrimination through exclusionary qualification standards and
4
stereotypical assumptions about their ability to contribute to society.
Over the course of nearly twenty years of litigation, however, the courts
systematically removed rights that Congress had conferred on people
with disabilities by narrowly construing the term “disabled” under the
5
ADA. In response, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) to bring the courts back in line
with congressional intent by amending the ADA and instructing courts
6
to interpret “disability” more broadly.
This Note evaluates recent court decisions that have put the
disabled status of a plaintiff on trial for a second time: once when
determining whether the person is an “individual with a disability” and
again when determining whether the plaintiff is “qualified” for the job
(in other words, whether the person can perform the “essential
functions” of the job). This Note argues that courts have used the
qualified individual analysis to do precisely what Congress instructed
them not to—permit discrimination against people with disabilities in
employment—and as a result, they are not meeting the goals of the ADA
or the ADAAA. This Note also argues that the “ideal worker” norm
underlies the reluctance of courts to impinge on an employer’s business
judgment, and as a result, courts limit the ability of disabled plaintiffs to
challenge the determination of what constitutes an “essential” function
of the job.
Part I of this Note outlines the history and purpose behind the
ADAAA. Part II describes the successes of the ADAAA in recent court
decisions. Part III demonstrates that courts have continued to limit the
ADAAA’s ability to remedy disability discrimination by focusing on
whether a person is a “qualified individual” with a disability, which gives
employer-defendants a second chance to challenge the disabled status of
the plaintiff. Part IV of this Note argues that courts often instinctively
use workplace norms in granting deference to employers on the question
of what constitutes an essential function; however, courts and the ADA
will only make inroads on workplace accommodations for disabled
persons through illuminating these norms in the essential functions
analysis. This Note suggests several solutions: Congress should consider
amending the ADA to—once again—override the developing trend in
the courts against disabled plaintiff-employees by (1) clarifying that it did

3. Id. § 2.
4. Id.
5. Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. &
Lab. L. 19, 22 (2000).
6. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117).
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not intend for courts to defer to an employer’s determination of what
constitutes an “essential function,” and (2) modifying the “qualified
individual” inquiry to favor a more balanced approach that takes into
account the goals and purposes of the ADA. This amendment would
allow for a more robust determination of what qualifies as a “reasonable
accommodation.”

I. The History of the ADAAA
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Americans with disabilities face far worse job prospects than those
without disabilities. Even twenty years after the passage of the ADA,
17.3 percent of persons with disabilities are employed, as compared to
7
64.2 percent of the general population. According to the Census Bureau,
8
56.7 million people, or nineteen percent of the population, have a disability.
9
Some consider disability “the last frontier for workplace equality.” In
enacting the ADA, Congress stated, “[U]nlike individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination
on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
10
discrimination.” Effective March 24, 2014, affirmative action guidelines
for federal contractors mandated a seven percent workforce utilization
11
goal for individuals with disabilities. This recent regulation is motivated
by the fact that underutilization of persons with disabilities has been a
12
historical cause of income inequality in the United States.
In light of a history of underutilizing the disabled workforce, as well
as exclusionary job qualification standards, Congress passed the ADA in
1990 to provide a “clear and comprehensive national mandate for the

7. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation—March
2015 tbl. A-6 (2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
8. Nearly 1 in 5 People Have a Disability in the U.S., Census Bureau Reports, U.S. Census Bureau
(July 25, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/miscellaneous/cb12-134.html.
9. Barbara Otto, Hey Employers: If You Build It, Job Seekers with Disabilities Will Come,
Huffington Post (Sept. 13, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/barbara-otto/job-seekerswith-disabilities_b_3921181.html.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (2015).
11. Affirmative Action and Nondiscrimination Obligations of Contractors and Subcontractors
Regarding Individuals with Disabilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,681, 58,682 (Sept. 24, 2013) (to be codified at
41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741).
12. Id. (“The median household income for ‘householders’ with a disability, aged 18 to 64, was
$25,420 compared with a median income of $59,411 for households with a householder who did not
report a disability.”); see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (“[C]ensus data, national polls, and other studies
have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and
are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally . . . .”).
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elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
Individuals alleging discrimination based on an actual disability can pursue
remedies based upon the following claims:
(1) Failure to accommodate—demonstrating a failure to make a
reasonable accommodation to an “otherwise qualified individual” unless
such entity can “demonstrate” that the accommodation would impose
14
an undue hardship;
(2) Unlawful qualification standards—demonstrating that the entity
imposed unlawful qualification standards that screen out individuals with
disabilities and those standards are not “shown to be job-related for
15
the position in question and . . . consistent with business necessity;” or
(3) Adverse employment action—demonstrating that an adverse
16
action occurred because of a person’s disability.

This Note primarily focuses on (1) and (3), but discusses (2) below in
17
relation to one scholar’s interpretation of the essential functions inquiry.
To prove a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the
ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she has a disability; (2) she is
qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the
essential functions of the position; and (3) the employer took an adverse
action against the plaintiff because of the disability (or failed to make
18
reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff). This Note focuses on the
“disability” and “qualified individual” prongs, as courts have primarily
used these two prongs to limit plaintiffs’ access to relief under the ADA
and ADAAA.
Despite a congressional mandate prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of disability, federal courts have eroded the protections of the
ADA in a series of decisions that interpreted “disability” narrowly.
Beginning with Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., the Supreme Court
severely limited the scope of the ADA by interpreting “disabled” to
exclude individuals whose disability could be corrected through the use
19
of mitigating measures, such as eyeglasses or medications. In Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Court continued to
13. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
15. Id. § 12112(b)(6).
16. The general rule under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) is as follows: “No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Discrimination based on membership in
the protected classification is determined pursuant to the burden-shifting framework established by
the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
17. See discussion of Michael C. Subit, infra note 126.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12112.
19. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475, 482 (1999) (holding that twin sisters with
severe myopia did not qualify as “disabled” because their vision could be corrected by wearing
glasses).
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narrow the ADA by holding that the term “disability” should be
“interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
20
disabled” under the statute. The Court further held that to be
substantially limited in performing a “major life activity,” the impairment
must prevent an individual from doing activities that are of “central
21
importance” in most people’s daily lives. For instance, activities like
standing or lifting were not considered “central” to most people’s daily
lives; therefore, difficulties walking or the inability to lift weights of a
certain amount were not considered disabilities. In so holding, the Court
referenced the ADA of 1990, where Congress found that some 43 million
Americans have a disability, and reasoned: “If Congress intended everyone
with a physical impairment that precluded the performance of some
isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as
disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been
22
much higher.” In addition to the determination that the activity must be
central to most people’s daily lives, the Court held that the impairment
23
must also be “permanent or long term.”
Because of this restrictive definition of “disability,” between 1990
and 2008, plaintiffs rarely qualified as disabled, and employers won
24
summary judgment in more than ninety percent of all disability claims.
Moreover, litigants that could succeed were caught in a particularly
difficult situation because even if they qualified as disabled under this
extreme limitation, their own disabilities were likely so severe as to
25
render them “unqualified” for the positions they sought.
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008
President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA into law in September
26
of 2008. Under the statute, the definition of disability is the same as that
27
under the ADA. According to the ADAAA, the term “disability” means

20. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187, 197 (2002) (emphasis added)
(holding that carpal tunnel syndrome did not qualify as a disability).
21. Id. at 198.
22. Id. at 197.
23. Id. at 198.
24. Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Enfeebling the ADA: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 62 Okla. L.
Rev. 667, 692 (2010) (citing Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?,
59 Ala. L. Rev. 305, 306 (2008)).
25. Hillary K. Valderrama, Is the ADAAA A “Quick Fix” or Are We Out of the Frying Pan and
Into the Fire?: How Requiring Parties to Participate in the Interactive Process Can Effect Congressional
Intent Under the ADAAA, 47 Hous. L. Rev. 175, 198 (2010) (quoting Charles B. Craver, The Judicial
Disabling of the Employment Discrimination Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 Lab.
Law. 417, 450 (2003)).
26. See Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2d Sess.
2008); The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/adaaa_info.cfm (last visited June 9, 2015).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2015).
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“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
28
major life activities” of an individual. An individual may also show she
has a disability by having “a record of such an impairment,” known as
the “record-of” prong, or by “being regarded as having such an
29
impairment,” commonly referred to the “regarded-as” prong. Legislative
history indicates that Congress enacted the ADAAA to reject the
Court’s narrow interpretations of “disability” and “reinstat[e] a broad
30
scope of protection to be available under the ADA.” This finding was
31
codified in the definitional section of the ADA. Some legal scholars
have described these amendments as “instructional,” in the sense that
the ADAAA directs courts to “interpret the same statutory language in a
32
different way.”
The statute attempts to achieve a broad scope of coverage in three
ways. First, the ADAAA indicates that courts should construe the
definition of disability in order to give “broad coverage” to affected
33
individuals. The direction to interpret “disability” broadly, along with
the provision of a non-exhaustive list of conditions that qualify as “major
34
life activities,” are direct responses to the Supreme Court’s restrictive
interpretations of the ADA, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (“EEOC”) previous regulations, which set the burden of
35
proof for proving “substantially limits” higher than Congress intended.
36
Finally, as a rejection of the Sutton standard, the ADAAA provides
that courts should not consider mitigating measures, such as medication
or assistive devices, to determine whether an impairment substantially
37
limits a major life activity.
Second, the amendments make it easier for an individual to qualify
as disabled because it provides a non-exhaustive list of what constitutes a
38
major life activity. For instance, an impairment will limit a major life
activity if it affects “seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, [or] walking” or affects

28. Id. §12102(1)(A); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i) (2015).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B)–(C). This Note focuses on the “actual disability” prong of the ADA.
30. H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 2 (2008).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (“The definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in
favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the
terms of this chapter.”).
32. Kate Webber, Correcting the Supreme Court—Will it Listen? Using the Models of Judicial
Decision-Making to Predict the Future of the ADA Amendments Act, 23 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 305,
352 (2014).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
34. Id. § 12102(2).
35. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(6), 122 Stat.
3553, 3554.
36. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (noting that “no agency . . . has been
given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA’’).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i).
38. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
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major bodily functioning, such as “functions of the immune system, normal
cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory,
39
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” According to
Congress, the broad definition of what qualifies as a major life activity
was intended to reject the Toyota standard, which required that the
impaired activity be of “central importance” to most people’s daily
40
lives.
Third, unlike the ADA, which only delegated procedural
rulemaking authority to the EEOC, the ADAAA explicitly delegated
broad rulemaking authority to the EEOC to interpret the definition of
“disability” and enact rules of construction in order to carry out the goals
41
of the Act. As a result, the EEOC has issued a series of regulations that
42
expand what qualifies as an “impairment.” The EEOC additionally
stated that the “effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last fewer
43
than six months can be substantially limiting,” eliminating any
suggestion that an intermittent or short-term impairment does not
qualify as a disability.
With this expanded definition of disability, some legal scholars
thought that the ADAAA would open the floodgates of litigation by
allowing claims by persons who “do not have a disability under any
44
rational interpretation of that term.” Human resources professionals
likewise argued that the amendments would “radically expand the
45
ADA’s coverage” by including people with minor impairments. Other
legal scholars predicted that a broadened definition of disability would
make it “less likely that employers [would] be able to succeed on a
46
motion for summary judgment.”
Under the qualified individual prong, an employee must (1)
“satisf[y] the prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the
appropriate educational background, employment experience, skills,

39. Id. § 12102(2)(A)–(B).
40. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(4).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12205a.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2015) (an impairment includes “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine [systems]”).
43. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix).
44. See, e.g., Amelia Michele Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 San Diego L. Rev.
331, 366 (2010).
45. Memorandum from Jeffrey C. McGuineess, President, HR Policy Ass’n to HR Policy Prime
Representatives (Sept. 28, 2007), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/archiveada/documents/1HRPolicyMemo_
000.pdf).
46. See, e.g., Evan Sauer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: The Mitigating Measures Issues, No
Longer a Catch-22, 36 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 215, 236 (2010).
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47

licenses, etc.” and (2) be able to “perform the essential functions of the
48
position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation.”
The purpose of this essential functions inquiry, according to the EEOC,
is to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not denied jobs they are
able to perform because they cannot perform marginal functions of the
49
position. A job function may be essential if (1) “the reason the position
exists is to perform that function” or (2) there are a “limited number of
employees available among whom the performance of that job function
50
can be distributed.” Thus, for instance, a truck driver who must drive a
truck across state lines and cannot obtain an appropriate commercial
license from the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) may not be a
“qualified individual” under the statute.
C. The Broader Picture: Explaining Judicial Hostility
Before turning to current case law under the ADAAA, this Subpart
looks at the work of legal scholars who have attempted to explain why
courts have been hostile to the ADA, and how these theories may apply
to the ADAAA as well. Each theory attempts to provide a framework
for understanding, and thus rectifying, judicial hostility to disability
discrimination claims
Kevin M. Barry describes the ADA as a “micromanager” statute
because it attempted to answer all of the questions surrounding its
implementation in detail, whereas its counterpart and predecessor, the
51
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was a “delegating” statute that expected
52
courts to fine tune the ambiguities. The Rehabilitation Act applies to
federal employers, and violations of section 504 are evaluated under the
53
same standard as the ADA. Thus, “where section 504 of the
54
Rehabilitation Act is cursory, the ADA is rife with detail.” With such a
comprehensive statutory scheme, Barry posits that it is “appropriate for
a court to rely solely on the text” of the statute, without reference to
55
legislative objectives or interpretive guidance. However, as a natural
outcome of the ADA being a micromanager statute, courts would look
no further than the text of the statute in construing its terms. On this

47. Interpretive Guidance on Title 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.2(m) (2015).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 1630.2(n)(2).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2015).
52. Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What Congress Intended?, 17 Emp. Rts & Emp. Pol’y J. 5, 16–17 (2013).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 791(f) (“The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated
in a complaint alleging . . . employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards apply
under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”).
54. Barry, supra note 52, at 18.
55. Id. at 17.
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view, the observed hostility to the ADA can be explained by the fact that
courts have relied primarily on the limited guidance of the statute on the
particular question of what qualifies as a “disability,” without looking to
56
the interpretations and regulations promulgated by the EEOC.
Various other scholars posit a more transsubstantive theory of why
courts have been unreceptive to the ADA—namely, the courts have
57
been hostile to employment discrimination statutes writ large. Courts
may be ideological activists on questions of equality and discrimination
because these issues sometimes overlap with constitutional questions of
58
equal protection, the latter of which is the province of the courts. With
the disabled in particular, it is interesting to note that decisions limiting
the reach of the ADA mirror the refusal to afford heightened scrutiny to
59
laws that affect people with disabilities. In this context, Deborah A.
60
Widiss notes the phenomenon of what she terms “shadow precedents.”
Widiss argues that courts
narrowly construe the significance of congressional overrides and
instead rely on the prior judicial interpretation of statutes as expressed
in overridden precedents. Thus, for example, although Congress clearly
disagreed with a Supreme Court decision holding that pregnancy
discrimination is not sex discrimination, lower courts noting that the
statutory language of the override only explicitly references “pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions,” continue to apply the
reasoning employed by the Court in that overriden case when faced
61
with sex discrimination claims in other contexts.

Widiss explains how courts have narrowly construed the Pregnancy
62
Discrimination Act (“PDA”), which explicitly amended Title VII to
include in the definition “because of sex” that “women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
63
same for all employment-related purposes.” For instance, Widiss notes
that courts have followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in General
64
Electric Co. v. Gilbert when they hold that breastfeeding is not within
the strict meaning of the PDA. These courts reason that because the
express language of the PDA does not include breastfeeding, Title VII
does not cover policies that draw distinctions among persons on the basis

56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Webber, supra note 32, at 351; Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the
Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511,
537 (2009).
58. Id.
59. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
60. Widiss, supra note 57, at 512.
61. Id.
62. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
63. Id.
64. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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of breastfeeding. This is despite the fact that the PDA was enacted to
reject the reasoning of Gilbert and to make clear that “distinctions based
66
on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII.”
From a normative perspective, courts may express resistance to
disability claims because these claims challenge entrenched workplace
norms, such as how particular job functions should be completed. Joan
Williams, writing in the context of gender discrimination, describes the
background norm of the “ideal worker”—a powerful norm that limits
67
workplace equality for women. She posits that an “ideal worker” in the
United States would be male, work eight hours per day plus overtime,
68
and have no children. Courts may assume, for instance, that physical
presence at the job site is necessary, without requiring proof that the
requirement is essential to the specific job, even in the face of
69
countervailing evidence. Employers and the courts may view the ADA
as a “preferential treatment law that forces employers to ignore
70
employee qualifications and economic efficiency.” Critics thus view the
ADA as a law designed to give special treatment to people with
disabilities, rather than one that takes these background norms into
71
account. This Note proposes that the workplace norms described by
Williams and others are a normative grounding for the workplace
policies—such as attendance, work schedules, and methods of
performing particular job functions—that the ADA intended to
72
challenge through the reasonable accommodation process. This Note
argues that courts often instinctively use these very norms in granting
deference to employers on the question of what constitutes an essential
function; however, courts and the ADA will only make inroads on
workplace accommodations for disabled persons through considering
these norms in the essential functions analysis.
With an understanding of the history of the ADA, the ADAAA,
and a potential understanding of why courts have been hostile to the
ADA, the next Part of this Note turns to the ADA case law in the postADAAA world. This Note will then explain how some current judicial

65. Widiss, supra note 57, at 554 (citing various post-PDA cases that follow the reasoning of Gilbert).
66. H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978).
67. Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1559, 1597 (1991).
68. Id. at 1569.
69. See, e.g., McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2013).
70. See generally Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior & the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 345, 377 (1997).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. 11, 451 (1990) (citing Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th
Cir. 1981) (noting that an employer erroneously required the use of both arms when the function of
the position—lifting and carrying mail—could nonetheless be carried out by the employee who only
had one arm).
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interpretations of the qualified individual prong of the prima facie case—
namely, whether the plaintiff can perform the essential functions of the
job—bar a plaintiff’s ability to successfully bring a discrimination claim.

II. Courts Have (Almost) Universally Embraced an
Expansive Definition of Disability
Courts have almost universally embraced the expansive definition of
73
disability under the ADAAA. As an example, since the passage of the
74
ADAAA, courts have newly acknowledged Type II diabetes and sleep
75
apnea as “disabilities” under the Act. Noting the expansive coverage of
the ADAAA, for instance, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found fibromyalgia to be a disability, even though the course
76
of the disease is episodic and only appears in wet or rainy weather. At
least one commentator looking at district court decisions through 2012
indicated that federal district courts are in fact carrying out the objectives
77
of the ADAAA.
Nonetheless, several trial courts have incorrectly applied pre-ADAAA
78
case law to current disability claims. It is unclear whether the Courts of
Appeals will allow these decisions to stand, as many are just beginning to
interpret the ADAAA, and not every circuit has had a chance to consider
79
the ADAAA. One of the first interpretations of “disability” under the

73. See Barry, supra note 52, at 28–31 (noting that lower courts have found a wide array of
impairments to be disabilities under the ADAAA, including “alcoholism, ankle injury, anxiety
disorder, auto-immune disorder, back injury, bipolar disorder, brain tumor, broken legs, cancer, carpal
tunnel syndrome, depression, diabetes, eating disorder, fibromyalgia, Friedreich’s Ataxia (a degenerative
neurological condition), gastrointestinal problems, heart disease, HIV infection, insomnia, monocular
vision and other vision problems, multiple sclerosis, obesity, obsessive compulsive disorder, pain in
hands, joints, and hip, psoriatic arthritis, sleep apnea, stuttering, and TIA (mini-strokes)”).
74. Szarawara v. Cnty. of Montgomery, No. 12-5714, 2013 WL 3230691, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2013).
75. Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10-861, 2012 WL 604169, at *5–6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012).
76. Howard v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, No. 11-1938, 2013 WL 102662, at *11, 12 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 9, 2013); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2015).
77. See Barry, supra note 52.
78. Compare Fierro v. Knight Transp., No. EP-12-CV-00218-DCG, 2012 WL 4321304, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2012) (“[M]erely having cancer—which, though, may be an ‘impairment’ . . . is
not enough to support an inference that Fierro has an actual disability.”), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)
(2015) (Major life activities include “the operation of a major bodily function, including . . . normal cell
growth . . . .”), and 11 Civ. 2450 (HB) National Disability Law Reporter (Jan. 10, 2012) (holding that
under the ADAAA, “[c]ancer will ‘virtually always’ be a qualifying disability because abnormal cell
growth is a limitation on a major bodily function”). Moreover, the term “substantially limits” ought to
be construed expansively. EEOC regulations provide that “[a]n impairment is a disability within the
meaning of this section if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life
activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (emphasis
added). Thus, cancer should qualify as a disability under this definition.
79. Part of the reason for the delay in cases considering the ADAAA is that the amendments did
not take effect until January 1, 2009, and courts construed this to mean that the ADAAA did not
apply retroactively. See Price v. City of New York, No. 13-1533, 2014 WL 983506, at *121 (2d Cir.
2014); Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 299 F. App’x 488, 494 (6th Cir. 2008); Levy ex rel. Levy v.
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ADAAA came from the Fourth Circuit in Summers v. Altarum Institute.
There, the court was faced with an ambiguity in the statute, specifically
81
whether a temporary impairment qualified under the disability prong.
82
Noting that Congress intended the ADAAA to apply broadly and that
83
the EEOC regulations should be given deference, the court held that even
temporary impairments would qualify for protection if they substantially
84
limited a life activity.
Similarly, panels of the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have
broadly interpreted “disability” under the ADAAA. In March 2014, the
Eleventh Circuit, noting the expansive definition of disability, reversed a
lower court order holding that a degenerative back disease was not a
85
disability. In August 2014, the Third Circuit similarly upheld a jury
verdict for a plaintiff who suffered from alcoholism and was terminated
86
following her admission to a drug rehabilitation program. Finally, in
December 2013, the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court order that
had concluded that high blood pressure with intermittent blindness was
87
not a disability because it was “transitory” and “suspect.” In reversing
this order, the circuit court held that high blood pressure itself, even
without loss of eyesight, was a disability under the ADAAA because it
88
affects circulatory function, which is a major life activity. Moreover, the
court determined that it was irrelevant that the plaintiff could control his
high blood pressure with medication because mitigating measures are not
89
relevant to the existence of a disability under the ADAAA.

Hustedt Chevrolet, No. 05-4832(DRH)(MLO), 2008 WL 5273927, at *4 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2008);
Gibbon v. City of New York, No. 07 Civ. 6698(NRB), 2008 WL 5068966, at *5 n.47 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25,
2008); Kiesewetter v. Caterpillar Inc., 295 F. App’x 850, 851 (7th Cir. 2008); Parker v. ASRC Omega
Natchiq, No. 6:08-CV-00583, 2008 WL 4974584, at *5 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2008), aff’d, 2009 WL
2903707 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2009).
80. Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2014).
81. Id.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2015).
83. Summers, 740 F.3d at 329, 331–33 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)).
84. Id. at 332.
85. Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1269–1270 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding
that a doctor’s affidavit stating that the plaintiff’s herniated disc limited his “ability to walk, bend,
sleep, and lift more than ten pounds” was sufficient to survive summary judgment under “the new
standards and definitions put in place by the ADAAA”).
86. See Diaz v. Saucon Valley Manor Inc., 579 F. App’x 104, 109 (3d Cir. 2014).
87. Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 1171 (7th Cir. 2013). The court also noted,
without deciding, that temporary an impairment that may be eliminated by surgical intervention may
not qualify as a disability.
88. Id. at 1173.
89. Id. The ADAAA provides that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (2015). This explicitly overrides the Court’s reasoning in Sutton
v. United Airlines, Inc., which held that if a person’s impairment is corrected, it does not substantially
limit a major life activity, and therefore it cannot be a disability. 527 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999).

N - OLSEN_16 (ONLINE)

1498

6/22/2015 9:44 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1485

Thus, the several circuit courts that have considered what counts as
a disability in the post-ADAAA world, along with a number of district
court decisions saying the same, suggest that the majority of courts have
adopted a broad interpretation of “disabled” under the ADAAA. As a
result of the broadened definition of “disabled,” courts are now more
willing to assume that a plaintiff is disabled—for purposes of a motion to
90
dismiss—and allow the case to proceed to discovery.

III. Continuing Hurdles for Plaintiffs with Disabilities
and the Essential Functions Inquiry
Despite these successes, disability discrimination claims still face
early dismissal on the basis that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the
91
“qualified individual” prong of her prima facie case. Specifically, courts
have dismissed claims under the theory that employees are not “qualified
individuals” under the ADAAA (and pre-ADAAA cases where courts
reached this question) because their disability makes them unable to
92
perform the essential functions of their current or desired job. When
making these decisions, two factors weigh against plaintiffs. First, the
employee carries the burden of proving she is qualified. Second, courts
defer to the employer’s judgment as to the employee’s qualified status.
This process puts the plaintiff’s disabled status on trial for a second time—
the first being the court’s determination of whether she is indeed disabled—
which frustrates congressional intent to create broad protections for
people with disabilities.
Deference to an employer’s judgment about essential job functions
severely limits the success of a plaintiff’s claim because it prevents the
employee from proving the qualified individual prong of her prima facie
case. According to one empirical study, whereas employers previously
won summary judgment on the basis of the disability prong and less
frequently on the basis of the qualified individual prong, employers now
win summary judgment much more frequently on the basis of the
candidate’s qualified status:

90. See, e.g., Barrilleaux v. Mendocino Cnty., No. 14-cv-01373-TEH, 2014 WL 3726371, at *5
(N.D. Cal. July 25, 2014).
91. Borrowed from the Title VII burden-shifting framework, the prima facie case requires a plaintiff
to show that (1) she met the qualifications of the job; (2) she suffered an adverse job action; and
(3) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based
on membership in the protected class. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
92. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 762–63 (5th Cir. 2015); Spears v. Creel, 2015
WL 1651646, at *5–6 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2015).
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[E]mployers thus far have achieved more favorable outcomes in the
post-amendment rulings on the qualified status issue. In the preamendment decisions, courts granted summary judgment to employers
in 47.9% of the outcomes, but this figure jumped to 69.7% in the postamendment outcomes, representing a more than 21 percentage point
93
increase.

This study suggests that those disabled plaintiff-employees are not moving
beyond the summary judgment stage on the basis of the qualified individual
prong, which seems to frustrate a central purpose of the ADAAA: to
refocus the attention of courts to the issue of discrimination and, thus, the
94
reasonable accommodation process. The study found that of 127 postADAAA cases, plaintiffs’ overall success increased 7.7 percent compared
95
to pre-ADAAA cases; however, the success of disability claims overall
would be even higher if not for the concomitant increases in summary
96
judgment on the basis of the qualified individual analysis.
Even if plaintiffs can demonstrate that they have a disability, the
barrier is whether, given their disability, they are a “qualified individual.”
As a reminder, the ADAAA defines a “qualified individual” as someone
“who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
97
essential functions” of the job. The EEOC regulations outline seven
non-exclusive factors to determine what qualifies as an “essential job
98
function.” Many courts, however, focus almost exclusively on two factors:

93. Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA Amendments
Act, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 2027, 2067 (2013).
94. See 154 Cong. Rec. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (the issue under the ADAAA is whether
discrimination occurred).
95. Befort, supra note 93, at 2069.
96. Id. at 2070.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2015) (“The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall
be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this
description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”). The statute provides
an “undue hardship” defense that excuses an employer from making an accommodation if it “can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
98. The regulation reads:
Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to:
(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for
the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(viii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
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the employer’s judgment as to essential functions and written job
99
descriptions prepared by the employer.
Scholars have warned that pre-ADAAA cases interpreting the
“essential functions” requirement could create “judicial backlash” against
100
disabled plaintiffs seeking to remedy discrimination under the Act. As
an example of the way courts may interpret the “essential functions”
requirement as a gatekeeper for ADA reasonable accommodation claims,
101
one scholar points to EEOC v. Picture People, Inc. There, a deaf
employee was hired as a “performer” for a photography studio to handle
102
“customer intake, sales, portrait photography, and laboratory duties.”
When Master Photographer Libby Johnston was hired to improve the
store, she noted that the plaintiff’s “written communications [were]
103
awkward, cumbersome, and impractical.” Despite only positive reviews of
her performance, including her success selling photo packages, and
criticism directed only at the method by which she accomplished those
104
duties, the studio assigned her almost exclusively to the lab, cut her
105
hours, and eventually terminated her in October 2008. The Tenth Circuit
ultimately upheld her termination, reasoning that verbal communication
was an essential function of the job, even though the plaintiff could
106
communicate through other mediums. In particular, the court found it
relevant that (1) “strong verbal communication skills” were stated as a
requirement of the employee’s position and (2) the employee’s nonverbal
communication skills did not provide her with the “fast, efficient” ability
to direct children while taking their pictures or the ability to sell photo
107
packages through verbal communication. The court found her inability
to communicate verbally to be a death knell for her qualified status,
especially since her employer only allowed twenty minutes for each photo
108
session.
The Picture People dissent argued that issues of material fact precluded
summary judgment for three reasons: First, no job descriptions or testimony
109
showed that strong verbal communication skills were required. Second,
the majority ignored evidence that the plaintiff did in fact perform the
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2015).
99. See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
100. See Amy Knapp, Comment, The Danger of the “Essential Functions” Requirement of the ADA:
Why the Interactive Process Should Be Mandated, 90 Denv. U. L. Rev. 715, 728 (2013).
101. Id.; EEOC v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 983–84, 986 (10th Cir. 2012).
102. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d at 984.
103. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. at 999 (describing the plaintiff’s “‘huge sale’ to the Krol family”).
105. Id. at 985.
106. Id. at 983–84 (discussing fact that plaintiff could, among other means, communicate by “writing
notes, gesturing, pointing, and miming”).
107. Id. at 986.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 998 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
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110

essential functions of her job. Third, although verbal communication was
a useful method of achieving an essential function of the position, namely
111
communication, it was not itself an essential function. To support its
argument, the dissent noted legislative history indicating that the
essential functions requirement was intended to focus “on the desired
112
result [of the function] rather than the means of accomplishing it.” This
case supports unthinking deference to an employer’s preference for
performing a job function in a particular way, which is clearly contrary to
congressional intent.
Thus, while Picture People is not demonstrative of a trend in the
case law, it demonstrates that where a plaintiff is found or stipulated to
be a person with disabilities, a court may nonetheless circumvent legislative
intent by focusing on the qualified individual analysis and deferring to
the employer’s judgment as to essential job function. Indeed, courts often
state explicitly that they defer to the employer’s judgment. The Second
Circuit, for instance, has stated that a court must give “substantial
deference to an employer’s judgment as to whether a function is essential
113
to the proper performance of a job.” Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has
stated that it “generally defer[s]” to an employer’s determination of
114
essential job functions. Other Courts of Appeals have similarly held
115
that written job descriptions are owed substantial deference. Lower
courts also take these courts at their word when they call for deference to
116
an employer’s judgment. Indeed, even in cases overturning narrow
employer-driven constructions of the essential functions inquiry, courts
maintain the use of this language. It is hard to see what “considerable
deference” to an employer’s judgment entails if both a variety of factors
117
ought to be considered and “no one listed factor will be dispositive.”
Moreover, courts are now frequently bypassing the “disabled” analysis
altogether, that is, assuming that even if the plaintiff is disabled, they are
not a “qualified individual” because they cannot perform the essential
118
functions of their job.

110. Id. at 999.
111. Id. at 998–99.
112. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2001)).
113. McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2009).
114. Feldman v. Olin Corp., 692 F.3d 748, 755 (7th Cir. 2012).
115. See, e.g., Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Eighth
Circuit cases generally give deference to the employer’s judgment of essential job functions, especially
when staffing is problematic.”); Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting
that a written job description was entitled to substantial deference).
116. See, e.g., McMillan v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV 4806(JSR), 2011 WL 5237285, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011), rev’d, 711 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013).
117. Id. at 126 (citing Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995)).
118. See, e.g., Beckner v. Tread Corp., No. 7:13CV00530, 2014 WL 6902328, at *6 (W.D. Va.
Dec. 8, 2014) (“The court will assume, without deciding, for purposes of this analysis that Beckner can
clear this first hurdle and carry his burden of establishing he had a disability as defined in the ADA.

N - OLSEN_16 (ONLINE)

1502

6/22/2015 9:44 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1485

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Picture People should be contrasted
with a case where the court correctly analyzed the essential functions
inquiry. In Keith v. County of Oakland, the Sixth Circuit held that summary
judgment was improper where a deaf lifeguard applicant’s job offer was
119
revoked based on a doctor’s speculation about the abilities of the deaf.
The plaintiff underwent a physical exam and the examining doctor stated
120
that he was not qualified because he was deaf. The plaintiff proffered
evidence that he could communicate, and established through the affidavits
of experts that the primary function of a lifeguard required attentiveness
121
to visual cues, not auditory ones. Accordingly, the court found that
reasonable minds could differ on the question of whether a deaf person
122
could perform the essential functions of the position. Thus, the court
correctly eschewed the employer’s demand that all lifeguards communicate
through auditory cues—instead, the essential functions inquiry properly
focuses on the desired tasks and the purposes of those tasks; here, that is
effective communication to ensure safety of pool patrons, and not how
that communication occurs.
With this as a background, this Note will now turn to how courts
have interpreted the essential functions analysis in cases decided under the
ADAAA. These cases fall into two sometimes overlapping categories:
courts that apply a presumption in favor of the employer’s determination
that certain job functions are essential despite congressional intent that
courts determine whether those functions are actually performed in a
123
particular job, and those that do not give deference to an employer’s
determination of essential job functions, instead favoring an individualized
inquiry. This Note argues that the latter approach, as exemplified by the

Indeed, the thrust of this case is at the second step—whether Beckner can establish that he was able to
perform the essential functions of the welding job.”).
119. Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 920, 930 (6th Cir. 2013).
120. Id. at 923–24 (“Dr. Work failed to make an individualized inquiry. After Dr. Work entered
the examination room and briefly reviewed Keith’s file, he declared, ‘He’s deaf; he can’t be a lifeguard.’
Dr. Work made no effort to determine whether, despite his deafness, Keith could nonetheless perform
the essential functions of the position, either with or without reasonable accommodation.”). Compare this
case with Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff’s Department, where a sheriff’s deputy suffered a stroke and
thereafter returned to work with some demonstrated irritability towards coworkers. 717 F.3d 736, 740
(10th Cir. 2013). There, the two doctors who examined the plaintiff found that his emotional problems
“could interfere with several essential job functions.” Id. at 744 (emphasis added). The court upheld
the termination on the ground that the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence that he was able to or had
actually performed under stressful situations. Id. While it is possible that this was similarly mere speculation
about the plaintiff’s abilities, the facts are less than clear, and there is no evidence that the doctors’
medical opinions were issued with such brevity and lack of individualized attention as those in Keith.
121. Keith, 703 F.3d at 923–24.
122. Id. at 927.
123. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337 (stating
that “essential functions” are those that are “fundamental and not marginal” to the position).
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approach of the Sixth Circuit in Rorrer v. City of Stow,
light of the purposes of the ADA.

1503
124

is correct in

A. Deference to the Employer
In cases decided under the ADA and the ADAAA, courts are split
on how much deference to give an employer’s determination of which
job functions are essential. The statute itself provides that a written job
125
description is “evidence” of essential job functions, which some legal
126
127
scholars and courts have interpreted to mean that Congress mandated
deference to an employer’s determination of what an essential job
128
function is. However, the House Report states that Congress rejected
an amendment that “would have created a presumption in favor of the
129
employer’s determination of essential functions.” This demonstrates that
Congress did not intend courts to defer to an employer’s determination of
what qualifies as an essential function. This conclusion is bolstered by the
purpose behind the statute—remedying discrimination against people with
disabilities, discrimination that ultimately stemmed from prejudgments
about those disabilities. Indeed, a congressional report reads, in part:
The Act is premised on the obligation of employers to consider people
with disabilities as individuals and to avoid prejudging what an applicant
or employee can or cannot do on the basis of that individual’s
appearance or any other easily identifiable characteristic, or on a
preconceived and often erroneous judgment about an individual’s
capabilities based on “labeling” of that person as having a particular
130
kind of disability.

This demonstrates that Congress did not intend courts to apply a
presumption in favor of employers when the statute only requires
“consideration” of a job description as “evidence” of an essential
131
function. Moreover, a presumption in favor of what the employer
deems to be an essential function would allow an employer to circumvent
a purpose of the ADA, which is to “prohibit employers from requiring
disabled employees to perform certain tasks that the law deems
132
nonessential.”

124. 743 F.3d 1025, 1039 (6th Cir. 2014).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2015).
126. See, e.g., Michael C. Subit, Clear as Mud: The Law on Reasonable Accommodation with Respect to
Qualification Standards 14 (2013) (unpublished paper presented at the ABA’s 2013 National Conference on
Equal Employment Law), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/
2013/04/nat-conf-equal-empl-opp-law/29_subit.authcheckdam.pdf.
127. See, e.g., Feldman v. Olin Corp., 692 F.3d 748, 755 (7th Cir. 2012).
128. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
129. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 446.
130. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 340 (emphasis added).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2015).
132. Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1043 (6th Cir. 2014).
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Nonetheless, a handful of Courts of Appeals (in addition to the
Tenth Circuit discussed above)—including the Eighth, Third, and Seventh
circuits—have allowed the essential functions requirement to serve as a
133
second bar to a plaintiff’s ability to bring disability discrimination claims.
134
Two other Courts of Appeals, including the Ninth and Second Circuits,
have used similar reasoning in holding an “attendance” policy to be an
essential function of the job; however, because these fall into a group of
cases dealing explicitly with attendance policies and work schedules,
135
these are included separately in the discussion below.
1.

The Eighth Circuit

Despite Congress’ intent that the essential functions inquiry focus on
136
job duties that are essential—meaning, fundamental —the Eighth
Circuit dismissed an employee’s argument that being DOT qualified to
137
drive was not an essential job function. The plaintiff argued that DOT
qualification was only required for the tangential (and rarely performed)
138
activities of training new employees and driving delivery trucks.
According to the district court, although the job description mandated
DOT qualification, the employee had not been required to regularly
operate a vehicle for the company—this duty was so rare that upon his
termination, the employee had gone more than a year without being
139
asked to drive a delivery truck. Rather than looking at the totality of
the circumstances, including the amount of time the employee spent
performing the function and the current work experience of incumbents in
similar jobs, on appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded, as a matter of
law, that DOT qualification was an essential function, relying on precedent
finding that a similar position at a different location required such a
140
qualification. In so concluding, the court did not require any current
evidence and effectively deferred to “the employer’s judgment, and the
141
experience and expectations” of the employer. As another court put it:

133. An empirical study notes that employers generally win summary judgment under the qualified
individual prong of the prima facie case. See Befort, supra note 93, at 2067.
134. See discussion of McMillan, infra pp. 1511–14, where the Second Circuit implicitly overruled
its prior decisions holding attendance to be an essential function. See also Samper v. Providence St.
Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2012).
135. See infra Part III.C.
136. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337 (stating
that “essential functions” are those that are “fundamental and not marginal” to the position); see also
Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1043 (stating that allowing an employer’s judgment of “essential” to control
“contradicts a central purpose of the ADA, which is to prohibit employers from requiring disabled
employees to perform certain tasks that the law deems nonessential”).
137. See generally Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 685 (D. Minn. 2012).
138. Id. at 692.
139. Id.
140. Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 914–15 (8th Cir. 2013).
141. Id. at 915 (citing Dropinski v. Douglas Cnty., 298 F.3d 704, 708–09 (8th Cir. 2002)).
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An “essential” task, however, is not any task that an employee would
feel compelled to perform if ordered to perform it by his or her
employer. . . . That definition—“a task is essential if the employer
orders it done”—contradicts a central purpose of the ADA, which is to
prohibit employers from requiring disabled employees to perform
142
certain tasks that the law deems nonessential.

The fact that similar employees in the past were required to perform this
143
activity has little bearing on the essential functions question with regard
to the current dispute about the essential functions of the position.
2.

The Third Circuit

In Yovtcheva v. Philadelphia Water Department, a case from the Third
144
Circuit, the plaintiff-chemist suffered from asthma. It was undisputed
that the plaintiff was disabled under the actual disability prong of section
145
146
12101. A chemical in the workplace made it difficult for her to breathe.
The employer attempted a reasonable accommodation by fitting the
plaintiff with a full-face respirator, although she was unable to use it
147
because she suffered from a panic attack while wearing it. Nonetheless,
the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual
148
under the ADA because she refused to accept a partial-face respirator.
The court concluded that such an accommodation could have “alleviated
Yovtcheva’s claustrophobia problems while protecting her from the effects
149
of exposure to any organic solvents.” Thus, because she refused the
second accommodation, the court found that she failed to establish the
150
second prong of her prima facie case. The court refused to consider the
plaintiff’s suggestion that a different solvent would have remedied her
asthma attack and avoided subjecting her to the panic attacks that a
respirator caused because, the court held, the employer is only required
151
to offer some accommodation. Although courts have generally held
that disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to the reasonable accommodation
152
of their preference, requiring a plaintiff to accept an accommodation

142. Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1043 (6th Cir. 2014).
143. Id.
144. Yovtcheva v. Philadelphia Water Dep’t., 518 F. App’x 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2013).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 121.
148. Id. at 121–22.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 122.
151. Id. at 122, 124.
152. See, e.g., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996) (“An employer is not
obligated to provide an employee the accommodation he requests or prefers, the employer need only
provide some reasonable accommodation.”); Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir.
1993) (“[A] reasonable accommodation generally does not require an employer to reassign a disabled
employee to a different position.”).
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that was in fact not an accommodation at all, in light of her other
impairment, is unreasonable. Thus, at a minimum, there appears a genuine
question of material fact whether the plaintiff was a “qualified individual”
and whether the employer offered a reasonable accommodation.
3.

Lower Courts and the Seventh Circuit as Exemplars

Lower court decisions also demonstrate the determinative nature of
153
the essential functions inquiry. For instance, in Shell v. Smith, the
plaintiff, an employee of the City of Anderson, suffered from a variety of
disabilities, including “hearing and vision impairments and cognitive
154
disabilities,” all of which prevented him from obtaining a driver’s license.
At the time, the plaintiff was working as a “Mechanic’s Helper,” a position
155
that he had held for twelve years. The plaintiff, also a vocal and politically
156
active Democrat, was terminated when a Republican Mayor took office
“solely” because he did not possess a commercial driver’s license
157
(“CDL”), which was listed as required in the job description. Following
Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court held that the twelve-year
158
“forgiveness” of this job requirement did not establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether a CDL was an essential function of the position.
Indeed, the court “presumed” the employer’s understanding controlled
what constituted an essential function of the job and granted the
159
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
B. Individualized Inquiry: Getting the Essential Functions
Requirement Right
Despite the above cases, some courts have held that the employer’s
job description is not controlling. One author has noted that “[e]ven though
the employee ultimately bears the burden of persuasion regarding her
qualifications, the courts have not blindly accepted employers’ assertions
160
that a function is ‘essential.’” Examples abound of district courts
considering all relevant factors in determining essential job functions:
One court has found that selectively timed enforcement of a so-called
essential job function can be evidence that the function was not essential,
161
but rather pretext for discrimination. Another court considered evidence

153. Shell v. Smith, No. 1:13-cv-00583-JMS-MJD, 2014 WL 3895951 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2014.).
154. Id. at *3.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *3–4.
158. Id. at *5.
159. Id. at *6.
160. Valderrama, supra note 25, at 204.
161. Scavetta v. King Soopers, Inc., No. 10-cv-02986-WJM-KLM, 2013 WL 316019, at *3 (D. Colo.
Jan. 28, 2013).
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that an employee never performed a function, such as lifting, in
162
determining whether that function was an essential function of the job.
Another held that despite a dispatch center’s twenty-four hour staffing
requirements, working night shifts was not necessarily an essential
163
function of the dispatcher job. These courts have properly followed
Congress’ intent that courts conduct a broad, fact-intensive inquiry to
164
determine what an “essential function” of a particular job is.
The Sixth Circuit recently explained a central problem with deference
to the employer’s judgment as to the essential functions. The court stated:
If an employer’s judgment about what qualifies as an essential task
were conclusive, an employer that did not wish to be inconvenienced by
making a reasonable accommodation could, simply by asserting that
the function is essential, avoid the clear congressional mandate that
employers make reasonable accommodations. . . . Written job descriptions
165
are also not dispositive.

The court emphasized that the qualified issue could not be decided
166
separately from the individualized inquiry. For those who request an
accommodation, a good faith interactive process is required to (1) identify
the limitations imposed by a disability and (2) ensure that applicants and
employees are not disqualified based on “stereotypes and generalizations
about a disability, but based on the actual disability and the effect that
167
disability has on the particular individual’s ability to perform the job.”
This interpretation is more consistent with the purposes of the ADAAA
because it emphasizes the need for changes in the workplace rather than
presumptively favoring an employer’s judgment of what qualifies as an
essential function. Moreover, this interpretation provides an individualized
assessment of the individual employee’s limitations by contextualizing
the employee’s specific limitations within the particular workplace when
determining the qualified status issue.
In April 2014, the Eleventh Circuit issued a splintered opinion
illustrating that an employer’s judgment about the essential functions of
168
a job is now a touchstone under the ADAAA. This opinion in Samson
v. Federal Express Corporation is the first Court of Appeals decision to
reverse summary judgment on the essential functions inquiry in the post162. Molina v. DSI Renal, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 984, 998 n.129 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (crediting an
employee’s testimony that she never lifted more than forty pounds, despite a job description stating
that lifting and carrying over forty pounds would be required occasionally).
163. Szarawara v. Cnty. of Montgomery, No. 12-5714, 2013 WL 3230691, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 27,
2013) (noting that “given the fact-intensive nature of the issue, it would be inappropriate at this stage
for the Court to decide whether working night shifts is an essential function of Plaintiff’s job”).
164. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 340.
165. Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1039 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1040 (citing Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d. 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013)).
168. Samson v. Fed. Express Corp., 746 F.3d 1196, 1201 (11th Cir. 2014).
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169

ADAAA landscape. The court held that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Samson, a vehicle mechanic with diabetes,
170
was a qualified individual under the statute. Federal Express (“FedEx”)
revoked Samson’s job offer for a technician position after he failed a
DOT medical certification, making insulin-dependent diabetics ineligible
171
per FedEx policy. The court correctly held that test driving delivery
trucks is a marginal function of the technician position, and therefore
172
being DOT qualified to drive was not an essential function of the job.
In holding that the essential functions inquiry was a question for the jury,
the court relied on the fact that FedEx Technicians do not perform this
function with any regularity and that the employee who was eventually
173
hired only test drove trucks three times over the course of three years.
Specifically, the court stated that if a job description were conclusive, an
employer could “avoid the clear congressional mandate” to make a
reasonable accommodation simply by asserting that a function is
174
essential. The dissent concluded that summary judgment would have
been proper because the employer had deemed occasional test driving to be
an essential function of the job, and therefore, it was an essential function
175
as a matter of law. The main point of contention between the dissent
and the majority was whether driving, although infrequent, could be an
176
essential requirement of the technician position.
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit recently refused to
provide absolute or substantial deference to an employer’s job description
177
in determining essential functions. The court held that a fact finder
178
must determine whether a function is essential on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, there is a developing emphasis on the essential functions inquiry
among the courts, a burgeoning split on interpreting the requirements of
the “qualified individual” analysis, and a dispute pertaining to just how
much deference is owed to an employer’s judgment regarding essential
job functions. On one end of the spectrum is the Seventh Circuit, which
presumes that those functions listed in an employer’s job description are
179
essential; at the other end of the spectrum are courts like the Sixth

169. Id. at 1202.
170. Id. at 1197, 1202.
171. Id. at 1198–99.
172. Id. at 1202.
173. Id. at 1202 (noting that the average hours that a Florida-based FedEx technician test drives is
3.71 hours per year, an insignificant portion of their time).
174. Id. at 1201 (citing Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007)).
175. Id. at 1206 (Hill, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697–98 (5th Cir. 2014).
178. Id. at 698.
179. See Feldman v. Olin Corp., 692 F.3d 748, 755 (7th Cir. 2012); see also discussion of Shell v. Smith,
supra Part III.A.3.
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Circuit in Rorrer v. City of Stow, which eschew rigid reliance on the
employer’s judgment because of the possibility that this will lead to
180
circumvention of the purposes of the ADA.
C. Workplace Policies as Essential Functions: Attendance and
Leave Policies
Finally, and intertwined with the above discussion, workplace policies
concerning attendance and leaves of absence are likely to be found essential
functions of a position, because regular attendance may be necessary for a
variety of reasons, such as building team morale or because the job requires
181
being physically on-site. This may be true even where the employer has
successfully modified or restructured a particular job to allow the employee
182
to continue working remotely. For instance, courts have held that “onsite regular attendance” is an essential function of a variety of jobs, such
183
as a nurse in the neonatal intensive care unit. Such courts hold that
184
“irregular attendance” can directly compromise essential job functions. In
McMillan v. City of New York, the Second Circuit reversed a lower court
grant of summary judgment where an eleven-year veteran of the City of
New York diagnosed with schizophrenia was unable to arrive “on-time” to
work because his “morning medications ma[de] him ‘drowsy’ and
185
‘sluggish.’” At some point in 2008, after the employee had worked for
the city for a decade, the employee’s supervisor decided that she would
enforce the city’s policy of instituting progressive disciplinary action for
186
“late arrivals.” In overturning the district court’s decision, the Court of
Appeals held that the “district court . . . relied heavily on its assumption
that physical presence is ‘an essential requirement of virtually all
employment’ and on the City’s representation that arriving” by 10:15 in
187
the morning was an essential function of the position. Looking to the
employee’s actual job performance and the city’s own policies, the court
concluded that a genuine issue of fact existed with regard to whether
188
arriving at a certain time was an essential function of the job. Specifically,

180. Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1051 (6th Cir. 2014).
181. Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 2012).
182. See, e.g., Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc’ns Corp., 987 F. Supp. 3d 918, 934–35 (S.D. Iowa 2013)
(“From a labor-management policy standpoint, it would be perverse to discourage employers from
accommodating employees with a temporary breathing space during which to seek another position
with the employer . . . . An employer does not concede that a job function is ‘non-essential’ simply by
voluntarily assuming the limited burden associated with a temporary accommodation, nor thereby
acknowledge that the burden associated with a permanent accommodation would not be unduly onerous.”).
183. Samper, 675 F.3d at 1238.
184. Id. at 1237.
185. 711 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2013).
186. Id. at 124.
187. Id. at 126.
188. Id.

N - OLSEN_16 (ONLINE)

1510

6/22/2015 9:44 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1485

McMillan’s supervisors approved or acquiesced to his late arrivals for a
period of nearly ten years, and “the City’s flex-time policy [that] permits
all employees to arrive and leave within one-hour windows implies that
189
punctuality and presence at precise times may not be essential.” The
court noted that “this case highlights the importance of a penetrating factual
190
analysis.” Looking to this case as an example, other courts should
similarly focus on whether such changes can be made, because it is only
then that entrenched workplace norms will be challenged and courts will
reach the question of whether such changes pose an undue hardship—a
feature of the statute that courts do not presently reach with any
191
predictability.
Both pre- and post-ADAAA case law invoke the belief that
192
attendance is generally an essential function of a job. However, this
outcome threatens protection under the ADAAA because people with
disabilities may often require leaves of absence or flexible scheduling for
193
medical care. Moreover, a blanket attendance policy contravenes the
194
demands of an individualized assessment under the ADAAA.
When an employer changes their attendance policy to accommodate
a person with disabilities, courts have improperly treated that as a
“restructuring” of the position that has no bearing on whether attendance
is actually an essential function. In Minnihan v. Mediacom Communications
Corp., the court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer,
who had attempted to accommodate the plaintiff by rearranging her
195
work schedule to allow her to avoid particular tasks. The court found
that “[t]o rule otherwise would discourage employers from making such
196
undertakings.” However, under the plain language of the statute, the
primary inquiry is whether the reasonable accommodation poses an undue

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2015) (defining “undue hardship” and factors that courts should
consider in determining whether an accommodation imposes an undue hardship).
192. See Susan Stefan, Hollow Promises: Employment Discrimination Against People with
Mental Disabilities 171 (2002) (“Many courts have decided a variety of very different ADA claims
with the simple assertion that regular, predictable attendance at work is an essential element of the job
as a matter of law, and an employee who cannot fulfill that requirement is not otherwise qualified for
employment. These decisions have been made without the benefit of further factual inquiry or a
trial.”); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 762–63 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that
attendance is an essential function as a matter of law for “most jobs”); id. (“[It is better] to follow the
commonsense notion that non-judges (and to be fair to judges, our sister circuits) [and] hold: Regular,
in-person attendance is an essential function—and a prerequisite to essential functions—of most jobs,
especially the interactive ones.”).
193. Stefan, supra note 192, at 172.
194. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2015) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.”).
195. Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc’ns Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d 918, 934 (S.D. Iowa 2013).
196. Id.
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197

hardship. The court appears to conclude that because an employer
deems a function essential such restructuring is unreasonable, and therefore,
it never addresses whether the accommodation imposes an undue hardship.
Arguably, where the employer makes a restructuring of a workplace
policy, especially for an extended period of time, this is evidence that the
position can be restructured regardless of whether it impacts the likelihood
that employers will willingly make such changes. Courts give a ‘‘significant
degree of deference to an employer’s business judgment about the
198
necessities of a job,” even when the inquiry should be what is a
necessary or fundamental function. This allows employers to circumvent “a
central purpose of the ADA, which is to prohibit employers from
requiring disabled employees to perform certain tasks that the law deems
199
nonessential.”
200
In Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp. Services, the Eighth Circuit held
that working a rotating shift was an essential function of working at a
dispatch center. The plaintiff, who suffered from diabetes, had requested
to work permanent day shifts because working rotating shifts caused her
to experience “erratic changes in blood pressure” that ultimately put her
201
at risk of “diabetic complications and death.” In holding that “working
a rotating shift” was an essential function, the court reasoned “[i]t is not
the province of the court to . . . determine what is the most productive or
202
efficient shift schedule for a facility.”
203
The Seventh Circuit, as well as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
204
Tenth Circuits, have all held that attendance or similar policies are an
essential function of a job. Recently, the Seventh Circuit went even further
by holding that “attendance” was an essential function of a job, despite
(1) evidence that the employer allowed employees to work from home,
(2) no evidence indicated that being on-site was critical to the job in
question, and (3) evidence that the employer required attendance purely
205
so that employees could be evaluated for human resources purposes. By
contrast, the D.C. Circuit (like the Second Circuit in McMillan) recently
held that a “penetrating factual analysis” is required to determine whether

197. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A) (2015).
198. Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 88 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Jones v. Walgreen Co.,
679 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2012)).
199. Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1043 (6th Cir. 2014).
200. 691 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2012).
201. Id. at 928.
202. Id. 928–31.
203. Basden v. Prof’l Transp. Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that that “an employer
is generally permitted to treat regular attendance as an essential job requirement and need not
accommodate erratic or unreliable attendance”).
204. See, e.g., Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases).
205. Taylor-Novotny v. Health Alliance Med. Plans Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 490 (7th Cir. 2014).
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physical presence, or “a ‘regular and reliable schedule’ is an essential
206
element of a” particular position. According to the D.C. Circuit, an
essential function of a position is a question of fact, and thus, attendance
cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed an essential function of any position
207
a priori.
One scholar, Michael C. Subit, suggests that the problem identified
here is traceable to the confusion created in differentiating “essential job
208
functions” and “qualification standards.” In Subit’s view, courts should
be finding that various requirements, such as attendance, are qualification
209
standards and not functions of a job at all. Applying this distinction
makes all the difference, because if a discriminatory qualification standard
were at issue, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business
210
necessity. Subit’s argument is a textual one—while essential job
211
functions are “fundamental job duties,” the statute separately prohibits
using qualification standards to “screen out an individual with a disability
or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard . . . is shown
212
to be job-related . . . and is consistent with business necessity.” Moreover,
qualification standards under the regulation are defined, separately from
essential functions, as “the personal and professional attributes including
the skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other
requirements established by a covered entity as requirements which an
individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or
213
desired.”
As an example, Subit points to Samper v. Providence St. Vincent
214
Medical Center, a case in which the Ninth Circuit held that attendance
215
was “an essential function of a neo-natal emergency room nurse.”
According to Subit, the court incorrectly held attendance to be a job
216
function, as opposed to an ongoing job qualification. On this view, courts
“short-circuit” the analysis required under the statute, in favor of
employers, by identifying a qualification standard as an essential function

206. See Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing and quoting McMillan v. City
of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013); Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29,
34–35 (1st Cir. 2000)).
207. Id.; see EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that because of “the
advance of technology in the employment context” “attendance at the workplace can no longer be assumed
to mean attendance at the employer’s physical location”).
208. See generally Subit, supra note 126.
209. See id. at 19.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2015).
211. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
213. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q).
214. Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2012).
215. Subit, supra note 126, at 14.
216. Id.
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of the job because a standard is not something that an employee
217
“does.” Thus, in Samper, the plaintiff’s skills and experience allowed
her to perform the essential functions of the job, so the appropriate
question was whether requiring attendance in the way the hospital did
was an unlawful qualification standard as outlined in a separate portion
218
of the statute.
219
In EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Northern District of
Illinois correctly applied this qualification standard inquiry. UPS had a
“100%-healed” policy, under which employees who had been on a
disability leave of absence for twelve months were administratively
220
separated from employment. The court found that UPS’s policy for
returning to work was not an “attendance policy,” and thus was not an
221
“essential function.” Rather, it was a “medical requirement,” which
222
would be a qualification standard. Although the court acknowledged
that the Seventh Circuit considered attendance to be an “essential
223
function” of a job, it distinguished essential function precedent by
focusing on how the EEOC “framed” the issue as a qualification
224
standard and not a job function, allowing the claim to proceed.
The UPS case is an outlier, and ultimately could signal that the issue
of “essential functions” bogging down ADAAA claims is simply an issue
of pleading standards. Contrary to Subit’s suggestion that this issue is
225
solely the fault of the courts, UPS demonstrates that some of the
confusion is, in part, the result of plaintiffs failing to plead that the job
qualification standards are discriminatory. However, plaintiffs alleging a
failure to accommodate will still face the essential functions inquiry.
Thus, courts will often deny plaintiffs’ claims on the qualified individual
prong. Moreover, employers may list a number of requirements in their
job descriptions—for instance, that a person must be available for eighty
hours in a workweek. Thus, a defendant-employer could argue that
attending is something an employee does, and thus is an essential job
function, just as working eighty hours per week is something an
226
employee does.
Assuming that Subit’s statutory interpretation is correct, this Note’s
identification of the essential functions inquiry as an increasingly present
hurdle in post-ADAAA case law is indicative of the courts’ failure to

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 16.
See supra Part I.A.
EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 09 C 5291, 2014 WL 538577 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2014).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 948–49 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Id.
See Subit, supra note 126.
Id. at 17–18.
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address entrenched workplace norms that the ADA intended to challenge.
Thus, only by addressing these norms head-on and allowing failure to
accommodate claims to move beyond the essential functions inquiry, will
courts begin to utilize the reasonable accommodation framework and
force changes in the norms the ADA and ADAAA intended to
227
challenge.

IV. Remedying the Problem with Essential Functions
As this Note has demonstrated, some courts continue to interpret
the ADA in an extremely restrictive fashion. Even in light of the
ADAAA, these courts foreclose plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of the
essential functions inquiry, without ever reaching the reasonable
accommodation analysis. This Part proposes potential legislative responses
to remedy the narrowed protections of the statute. Alternatively, it
argues that Congress intended the ADAAA to change entrenched
workplace norms, and thus, courts should interpret the essential
functions inquiry in a way that gives less deference to the employer’s
judgment about such functions.
A. The Third Time’s the Charm: Amending the ADA (Again)
Several legislative remedial solutions for this problem exist. First,
Congress could require courts to give greater evidentiary weight to how
often the employees (or similarly situated individuals) actually perform a
specific job function. Second, Congress could amend the definition of
“qualified” in the statute to emphasize the importance of duties that are
actually central to the position; basically, shift the courts’ focus to the
228
employers’ accommodations rather than the employees’ abilities. As an
alternative to these proposals, Congress could clarify that it did not
intend courts to defer to an employer’s judgment. Related to the first two
suggestions, and perhaps in conjunction with them, Congress could
clarify its intent that the EEOC has authority to issue regulations with
the force of law. Finally, Congress could require that an employer be
obligated to provide accommodations if they “knew or should have
known” that the employee was disabled, rather than the current system
which requires that the employer have actual knowledge of the disability
before they can be held liable.

227. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2015) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter
various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to
make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria,
segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.”).
228. Alternatively, courts could assess this when considering the business necessity defense, if the
employee did not allege a failure to accommodate.

N - OLSEN_16 (ONLINE)

June 2015]

1.

6/22/2015 9:44 PM

DISABLED BUT UNQUALIFIED

1515

Give Greater Evidentiary Weight to Actual Job Performance

Currently, the qualified individual portion of the ADA includes the
following statement:
For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the
employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if
an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered
229
evidence of the essential functions of the job.

Because an employer may invoke job descriptions as evidence of an
essential job function, courts—as this Note has shown—may give the
employer deference without looking to the functions actually performed.
An amendment to the statutory language focusing on actual
performance, as some courts have acknowledged is required by current
230
EEOC regulations, may be critical to ensure that the purposes of the
ADA are carried out. This will remedy one concern expressed during the
231
consideration of the original ADA : that the essential function
requirement was unworkable because employers would simply be
“rewriting job descriptions and defining what [constitutes an] essential
232
job function[] . . . in the morning, noon and night.” Indeed, under the
233
ADAAA, this is what employers are being advised to do.
2.

Amend the Definition of “Qualified” in the ADA to Focus on
Central Job Functions

Another potential amendment is for Congress to clearly define the
term “qualified” so that courts focus on the skills of plaintiffs, rather than
limitations. Specifically, Congress ought to require proof that the
function was central to position, and not a marginal or infrequently
performed function. At present, courts may use the qualified individual
analysis as a proxy for unfamiliarity, animus, or ableism by simply
234
deferring to the employer’s job description. Without accommodations,
employers are asking people with disabilities to perform their job duties

229. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
230. See, e.g., Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th Cir. 2009) (“To determine
whether POST certification is an essential job function, we begin by deciding ‘whether [the employer]
actually requires all employees in the particular position to satisfy the alleged job-related requirement.’”
(emphasis added)).
231. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 933 Before the S. Comm. on Labor &
Human Res. and the S. Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101th Cong. 51 (1989) (statement of Lawrence
Z. Lorber, Counsel, Am. Society of Pers. Admin.).
232. Id.
233. See Revamping Job Descriptions: It’s Like Christmas, Only Better!, 23 Ala. Emp’t Law Letter,
no. 4, 2012, at 3 (“[G]ive some thought to ‘hidden’ essential functions that you may have overlooked. For
instance, if overtime is required in all your production positions, make sure that is stated in each job
description for every production position.”).
234. Id.
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235

on an uneven playing field. Unlike proving one’s qualified status in the
Title VII context, where the employee’s skills or education are at issue,
the “qualified” issue in the ADA context inquires into the physical and
236
mental capabilities of the plaintiff. While this inquiry is important in
determining what a reasonable accommodation is or whether such an
accommodation can be made, courts may infrequently reach the reasonable
accommodation question because they find the plaintiff is unqualified for
the position and therefore not entitled to an accommodation.
An instructive example of the way in which the “qualified” issue
takes away from a focus on the possibility for accommodation is Neely v.
237
PSEG Texas, Limited Partnership. There, the Fifth Circuit held that
the ADAAA did not remove the requirement that an employee prove
she is qualified for the job in order to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination; and therefore, the district court did not err in approving
jury instructions that asked whether the plaintiff was a “qualified
238
individual with a disability.” Early drafts of the ADAAA omitted the
239
term “qualified” under the Act. Legislative history suggests that
Congress left the word “qualified” in the definition of discrimination
because it was concerned that removing the term would call into
question the burden-shifting framework under Texas Department of
240
Community Affairs v. Burdine. At least one commentator has taken
issue with the burden being on an employee because litigation will focus
almost exclusively on the limitations of the individual and rarely ask how
241
the employer could attempt to accommodate the disability. In Neely,
the trial court instructed the jury to focus on the limitations of the
242
plaintiff in deciding whether the plaintiff was qualified. Thus, the focus
remained on the question “what can this person not do and does this
disqualify the person from employment?” To the extent the qualified
status of the plaintiff is at issue, fact finders will remain focused on the
limitations of persons with disabilities.
3.

Require That the Employer “Knew or Should Have Known” of
the Disability

One author has suggested dispensing with the requirement that an
employer have actual knowledge of a disability, proposing instead that
235. Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and Resistance
Under the ADA, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 59, 110 (2009).
236. See Interpretive Guidance on Title 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630
app. § 1630.2(m) (2015).
237. Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 2013).
238. Id. at 247.
239. See H.R. Rep. No. 110-730, pt. 1, at 16 (2008).
240. Id.; see 450 U.S. 248, 252–56 (1981).
241. Knapp, supra note 100, at 733.
242. Neely, 735 F.3d at 244.
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liability result when the employer knew or should have known that the
243
According to the EEOC, reasonable
employee was disabled.
accommodations are changes “to the work environment, or to the
manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is
customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is
244
qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” As
discussed above, a plaintiff who experiences discrimination will have
difficulty reaching the reasonable accommodation inquiry because she
245
must first show that she is a “qualified individual” under the statute.
First, courts have been inconsistent in asking whether a reasonable
accommodation has been wrongfully denied. For instance, some courts
hold that an employee is required to prove that she is a qualified
246
individual before the employer has a duty to accommodate, while
others hold that the interactive process of requesting a reasonable
247
accommodation itself is designed to determine whether she is qualified.
This inconsistency arises from the murky link between the essential
functions analysis and the reasonable accommodation inquiry.
Second, courts are also split on whether an employee must disclose
the need for an accommodation or whether an employer may be put on
constructive notice. The Second Circuit requires that the employer knew
248
or should have known of the employee’s disability. However, the
Eleventh Circuit, like most other circuits, requires actual knowledge of
an employee’s disability in order for the employee to be able to proceed
249
with a failure to accommodate claim. As a result, courts rarely reach
the question of whether any change to the workplace would result in an
undue hardship on the employer and thus whether discrimination has
occurred—one of the central questions the ADAAA intended courts to
250
reach.
243. Knapp, supra note 100, at 736.
244. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii) (2015).
245. See infra Part III.A.
246. See, e.g., Weigert v. Georgetown Univ., 120 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 n.13 (D.D.C. 2000); Smith v. Blue
Cross Shield of Kan., 894 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1995).
247. See, e.g., Rorrer, v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1040 (6th Cir. 2014).
248. See Glaser v. Gap Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Brady v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Indeed, a situation in which an employer perceives an
employee to be disabled but the employee does not so perceive himself presents an even stronger case
for mitigating the requirement that the employee seek accommodation. In such situations, the
disability is obviously known to the employer, while the employee, because he does not consider
himself to be disabled, is in no position to ask for an accommodation. A requirement that such an
employee ask for accommodation would be tantamount to nullifying the statutory mandate of
accommodation for one entire class of disabled (as that term is used in the ADA) employees. We
therefore hold that an employer has a duty reasonably to accommodate an employee’s disability if the
disability is obvious—which is to say, if the employer knew or reasonably should have known that the
employee was disabled.”).
249. Howard v. Steris Corp., 550 F. App’x 748 (11th Cir. 2013).
250. See 154 Cong. Rec. S8344 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
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Finally, in reaching the reasonable accommodation analysis, the
requirement that the employer has actual knowledge of an employee’s
disability may constrain an employee’s claim. In Howard v. Steris Corp.,
the employer fired an employee who suffered from a “lifetime of daytime
sleepiness,” though virtually all of his 250 coworkers recognized him as
251
having a sleep disorder. After termination, the employee was formally
252
diagnosed as having obstructive sleep apnea. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that under
the statute, employers are required to provide reasonable accommodation
253
only to known disabilities. The court held that discrimination is “about
254
actual knowledge . . . not constructive knowledge and assumed intent.”
However, lowering the actual knowledge requirement would motivate
employers to accommodate people with disabilities more broadly.
Given that the “qualified” inquiry focuses on a wide array of job
duties, which are deemed by employers as essential functions, the law
should require employers to attempt to provide an accommodation where
employers have constructive knowledge of disability. Under this model,
the employer would be liable for failing to reasonably accommodate the
employee if:
(1) the employer knew or should have known about the employee’s
disability; (2) the employer did not make a good faith effort to discuss
with the employee the essential functions of the job and to assist the
employee in seeking accommodations; and (3) the employee could
have been reasonably accommodated had the employer made a good
255
faith effort to do so.

Under prong (1), the problem faced in Howard would be rectified—
employers on constructive notice of a disability would be required to
256
engage the employee in the interactive process.
One commentator has suggested that it would be economically
efficient for employers to engage in the interactive process early on if
they believe an employee may have a disability—this approach could
avoid the expense and time involved in litigation over failure to
accommodate claims, even if the employer would ultimately prevail on
257
summary judgment. Thus, both from an employer’s perspective and
with the goal of reaching the reasonable accommodation analysis, the
reasonable accommodation requirement should be an earlier and more

251. Howard, 550 F. App’x at 749.
252. Id. at 750.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 751 (citing Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1183 (11th Cir. 2005)).
255. Knapp, supra note 100.
256. See Katherine Bouton, Quandary of Hidden Disabilities: Conceal or Reveal?, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 20, 2013, at BU8 (describing the problems facing employees who must make the decision to
disclose that they have a disability).
257. Knapp, supra note 100.
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robust process. That is, constructive knowledge should be sufficient to
initiate the duty to reasonably accommodate. Another reply, discussed in
more detail below, is simply that sensitivities towards the disabled
community in the workplace must change. The purpose of the ADA and
the ADAAA is to emphasize that an individual’s right to participate in
258
society does not diminish simply by virtue of her disabilities.
4.

Explicitly Delegate Substantive Rulemaking Authority to the
EEOC

Congress delegated rulemaking authority to the EEOC in
259
interpreting the definition of “disability” under the ADA. The original
version of the ADAAA, however, would have delegated authority to
260
interpret all provisions of Title I of the ADA to the EEOC. The
wording of this provision, providing that all ADA regulations issued by
the EEOC were “entitled to deference,” was rejected as running contrary
261
to the Court’s Chevron jurisprudence. Congress had intended, by this
provision, to clarify that courts should give deference to agency
262
regulations and interpretive guidance, including the terms “disability,”
which indicates that Congress had intended greater deference to all
properly issued EEOC regulations. Moreover, because the “qualified
individual” analysis is specific to Title I and is not present in the general
263
definitional section that applies to all titles —whereas “disability” is
defined in a trans-agency section of the statute—it is a fortiori less
problematic, from a regulatory perspective, to delegate this authority to
264
the EEOC when the specific provision is not transsubstantive. Indeed,
the Supreme Court based its rejection of EEOC ADA regulations
precisely on the fact that the regulations would apply across agencies and
the fact that the EEOC did not have authority or expertise outside of the
265
employment context. Moreover, the EEOC regulations as currently
drafted provide no deference to the employer’s job description or
judgment, but rather, it is one among several factors the EEOC asks
266
courts to consider. Giving the force of law to EEOC regulations
through explicit delegation of rulemaking authority, therefore, could

258. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2015).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 12205a.
260. See H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. § 7 (2007) (“[D]uly issued Federal regulations . . . including
provisions implementing and interpreting the definition of disability, shall be entitled to deference . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
261. Id. (referring to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
262. Id.
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
264. See id. § 12111(8).
265. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (‘‘No agency, however, has been
given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA.’’).
266. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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have some impact on the courts’ interpretation of the “qualified
individual” inquiry.
Ultimately, however, any future amendments to the ADA ought to
do much more than instruct the courts to interpret the language of the
267
statute to provide broader protection to persons with disabilities. Kate
Webber argues that the ADAAA intends to instruct courts how to
interpret the existing language and to foreclose reliance on prior court
268
precedent, what she and Widiss call “shadow precedents.” Webber
posits that such instructional amendments in the ADAAA are not
sufficient, in part because a conservative court will find ways to narrowly
269
construe other parts of the statute to override congressional intent. She
explains, for instance, that courts would remain free to narrowly
interpret the term “‘substantially limits’ . . . so long as it is arguably lower
270
than the Toyota standard.” While this particular point is arguable
because Congress was clear about “expansive coverage” and lower
271
courts have generally followed this mandate, this Note provides
evidence that her ultimate conclusion was correct: where no precise
instruction exists on how to construe particular provisions, courts
272
continue to narrowly interpret the ADAAA. Thus, the goal of a third
273
round of amendments is to “say enough with sufficient precision” so
that courts will finally effectuate Congress’ intent to focus on
discrimination, and not whether a particular employee is a qualified
individual with a disability.
B. The Ideal Worker Norm
Returning to the idea of the ideal worker, it is now evident from the
case law on the essential functions inquiry that workplaces are not
universally required to create a level playing field for persons with
disabilities. In order to carry out Title I of the ADA, courts should take a
more robust role in enforcing changes in workplace norms. In part,
courts could achieve this role by understanding the background against
which the ADA and the ADAAA operate. The idea of the ideal worker
traces back to the Industrial Revolution:

267. With the ADAAA, Congress delegated to the EEOC interpretive authority over the
definition of disability and its rules of construction. Clarifying the authority of the EEOC to issue
regulations with regard to the essential functions inquiry may assist in ensuring due deference to the
EEOC’s current position that deference to an employer’s judgment as to an essential function is not
absolute. See EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 698 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Interpretive
Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(n) (2015).
268. Webber, supra note 32, at 345; Widiss, supra note 57, at 515–16.
269. Webber, supra note 32, at 346.
270. Id.
271. See infra Part II.
272. See infra Part I.
273. Webber, supra note 32, at 351.
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[P]eople with disabilities were measured against benchmarks of
productivity. The modern factory not only caused disabilities, but it
mass-produced notions of difference as inferior and impairments as
damning. It is from this period that many modern conceptions of ideal
or normal workers were drawn. Current oppression of people with
disabilities is thus connected all the way back to the birth of the
274
modern American workplace.

In order to carry out the goals of the ADAAA, courts should
address these norms directly and should not obfuscate them with the
qualified individual analysis. As one example of how courts could
directly address these norms, the court in McMillan stated:
[W]hile it may be essential in many workplaces that all tasks be
performed by employees who are both physically present and supervised,
these requirements are not invariably essential. Thus, depending on the
requirements of the position, an employee might need to be physically
present and supervised only for certain tasks. By way of example, and
without expressing any view on the question, it might be necessary for
a supervisor to be present when McMillan meets with clients in the
office, but not when he fills out forms. The district court appears to have
simply assumed that McMillan’s job required at least seven hours of
work each day and that the work could not be successfully performed
by banking time on some days to cover tardiness on others, while
working a total of at least 35 hours each week. A fact-specific inquiry,
275
however, requires consideration of this possibility on remand.

Despite the fact that employees, such as those in Knutson, Shell v. Smith,
276
and Picture People, performed the essential functions of their positions,
the courts still found in favor of the employers. These cases demonstrate
that courts have not required employers to accommodate employees in
cases where they were otherwise qualified.
The essential functions inquiry is a bar to plaintiffs’ claims under the
ADA. Perhaps more disturbing, as the dissent in Federal Express
277
demonstrated, courts often do not articulate any rationale for deferring
to employers when performing the essential functions inquiry, often
278
because of normative assumptions underlying the inquiry. Additionally,
if they do articulate such a rationale, it takes the form of a generalized
279
concern about impinging on the employer’s business judgment.
Dismissing plaintiffs’ claims at this initial stage without engaging in the
reasonable accommodation analysis allows normative assumptions about
the workplace to go unchallenged. Indeed, the ideal worker is one who
performs the job in the precise way that the employer has mandated,
274. Basas, supra note 235, at 97.
275. McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).
276. See supra Part III.A.1.
277. See supra Part III.A.1.
278. Samson v. Fed. Express Corp., 746 F.3d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 2014).
279. See, e.g., Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 88 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Jones v. Walgreen
Co., 679 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2012)).
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even if there are other ways of accomplishing this task that do not
impose an undue hardship on the employer. But this ideal worker is the
very norm the ADA intended to challenge.

Conclusion
The ADAAA, while clearing the way for courts to find more
plaintiffs to be disabled, has not succeeded in its goal of ensuring that
people with disabilities are protected from discrimination. Instead, courts
now use the “qualified individual” inquiry as a new bar to claims of
discrimination, and the courts’ general reluctance to impinge on an
280
employer’s business judgment can explain this trend, at least in part.
This Note has suggested that the judicial failure to utilize the language
and the burden shifting associated with qualification standards is not so
much a matter of confusion as it is symptomatic of hostility to claims
281
brought under the ADA. Congressional intent may be carried out by
clarifying the meaning of an “essential function” to avoid undue deference
to an employer. Specifically, Congress should provide, as members of
Congress intended (as demonstrated in the congressional record), that
there is no presumption in favor of the employer’s judgment with regard
to essential job functions. Moreover, Congress should clarify the
interpretive authority of the EEOC with respect to all aspects of Title I
282
of the ADA, and not merely with regard to the definition of disability.
Ultimately, if courts are not willing to enforce the purpose of the
statute in light of the congressional history, then Congress must provide a
more detailed statute to prevent the unduly narrow conception of
discrimination protection that is emerging. Webber’s analysis indicates
that simply providing instructional amendments to override Supreme
Court precedent is not enough, for ideologies like the ideal worker norm
will drive narrow interpretations of the statute, even in areas where
Congress has explicitly attempted to override the courts. Webber
concludes that the “key factor may be for the legislature to say enough,
283
with sufficient precision.” Although Congress will not likely take a
284
third swing anytime soon, courts can effectuate congressional intent by
interpreting the “qualified individual” prong in light of congressional

280. See Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.2(n) (2015).
281. See Webber, supra note 32, at 351. (“Ultimately, however, judicial resistance to protecting the
disabled and other minorities may only change if and when the Supreme Court’s ideological balance shifts
and a majority of Justices support the protection of employment equality.”).
282. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2015).
283. Webber, supra note 32, at 351.
284. See Jonathan Weisman, Underachieving Congress Appears in No Hurry to Change Things Now,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2013, at A14 (describing the 113th Congress as the “least productive” in history).
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purposes by avoiding a presumption in favor of the employer’s judgment
as to essential job functions.
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